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Abstract
This document describes the application of a differentially private algorithm to release public
transport usage data from Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW), Australia. The data consists
of two separate weeks of “tap-on/tap-off” data of individuals who used any of the four different
modes of public transport from TfNSW: buses, light rail, train and ferries. These taps are recorded
through the smart ticketing system, known as Opal, available in the state of New South Wales,
Australia.
1 Introduction
The Opal smart ticketing system1 has been introduced by the (state) Government of New South Wales
(NSW) in Australia as a means to use NSW’s public transport services. The Opal card can be used on
different transport modes managed by the Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW), including trains,
buses, light rail and ferries. A tap on using one of the Opal card readers at a location (train stations,
buses, ferry wharfs and light rail stops) marks the beginning of a trip and a subsequent tap-off records
the end of the trip. The data collected from the Opal card contains a rich set of information that
could be used to gain valuable insights about transport usage across NSW. The data if released could
bring potential benefits to commuters, businesses and others. However, if released in its raw form the
data can have many privacy violations such as the ability to track someone’s trip or series of trips. For
this reason, TfNSW and Data61/CSIRO engaged in a project to release a privacy-preserving version
of a sample of the Opal data as open data downloadable by anyone. We refer to this sample as the
Opal dataset in the rest of this document.
The Opal dataset consists of rows each of which indicates a trip from a single individual. A row,
among other attributes, contains a unique identifier for the Opal card, the trip date, transport mode
(bus, train, etc.), tap-on time, tap-off time, tap-on location and tap-off location. The tap-on and off
times have the granularity of one minute. The tap-on and off locations are the precise locations of
train stations, bus stops, ferry wharfs and light rail stops. The Opal dataset consists of trips from two
separate one week periods; a total of 14 days of data. To release Opal data in a privacy-preserving
manner, we used the notion of differential privacy [1]. Differential privacy gives a rigorous definition
of privacy that is tied to the process purported to provide privacy. Informally, the definition states
that a process (an algorithm) is differentially private if the output is indistinguishable if any single
individual’s data is removed from the dataset. The notion of indistinguishability is probabilistic in
nature and is quantified with the help of a parameter denoted ǫ, often called the privacy budget.
We prefer the use of differential privacy over ad hoc ways of de-identifying datasets, since the latter
1See https://www.opal.com.au.
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is a practice that can only check the (in)effectiveness of known attacks, and could be susceptible to
new attacks or future sources of background knowledge available to the attacker2 about individuals
in the dataset. In contrast, differential privacy is immune to new attacks3 or any future sources of
knowledge. The released Opal dataset is available for download at [4].
In what follows we first give a brief background on differential privacy in Section 2, slightly tailored
to the specific case of the Opal dataset. In Section 3, we describe the differentially private algorithm
used to release the Opal dataset, its privacy and utility guarantees and why it was chosen as the
algorithm suitable for the Opal dataset. In Section 4, we describe how the dataset was processed and
released, the differentially private nature of the whole process, and the privacy parameters used to
release the dataset. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
We assume a domain, i.e., data universe, X . An instance x ∈ X shall be called a point. A dataset D
is an n-tuple, each row of which is a point x ∈ X .4 We denote this as D ∈ Xn. In this document,
we assume each row of D to represent a trip from an individual. The attributes of the domain
X include, among other attributes, tap-on times and locations, tap-off times and locations, date of
the trip and transport mode. Notice that there is no distinction between sensitive or non-sensitive
attributes. Thus, the domain may include potentially identifying attributes such as the unique ID of
an individual making the trip. We denote a row of D by small case letters, e.g., x and y. For a row
x the value of the ith attribute is denoted xi. We say two n-row datasets D and D
′ are neighbours,
denoted D ∼ D′ if they differ in only one row. That is, both datasets contain n rows, n− 1 of which
are the same in the two datasets.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy [1, 5]). A randomized algorithm (mechanism) M : Xn → R is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every S ⊆ R, and for all neighbouring databases D,D′ ∈ Xn, the
following holds
P(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eǫP(M(D′) ∈ S) + δ.
If δ = 0, then M is ǫ-differentially private.
The parameter δ is required to be a negligible function of n [5, §2.3, p. 18], [6, §1.6, p. 9].5 The
parameter ǫ on the other hand should be small but not arbitrarily small. We may think of ǫ ≤ 0.01,
ǫ ≤ 0.1 or ǫ ≤ 1 [7, §1], [5, §3.5.2, p. 52]. When δ = 0, the resulting notion is sometimes referred to as
pure differential privacy in contrast to a non-zero δ, which is called approximate differential privacy.
In this document, we shall use differential privacy as an umbrella term for both pure and approximate
differential privacy. Where a distinction is required, we shall specifically indicate as such.
Remark 1 (Trip privacy). Since each row of the dataset D represents a trip, our notion of privacy
is related to trip privacy. That is, in the above definition of differential privacy two neighbouring
datasets differ in one trip. An individual may have multiple trips in the dataset. Thus, in this sense
we ensure that the addition or removal of a single trip of an individual does not change the output of
2We define an attacker as anyone who has access to the output data, which also covers accidental re-identification
of individuals in the released dataset(s).
3This guarantee follows from the definition of differential privacy. Some attacks might still be applicable either due
to the improper implementation of differential privacy [2] or due to threat models that are not captured within the
definitional framework [3]. For instance, the attack mentioned in the latter citation exploits the fact that there could
be time differences in answering different (online) queries depending on the dataset, thus releasing some side channel
information. This is not captured by the definition of differential privacy (the analyst only observes answers to the
queries and not other effects of the queries such as the time taken to answer the query). Both attack categories have
their counterparts in the field of cryptography as well.
4The distinction between a point and a row is important. A dataset may contain multiple rows that are equal to the
same point x ∈ X .
5A function f in n is negligible, if for all c ∈ N, there exists an n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, it holds that
f(n) < n−c.
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the differentially private algorithm beyond what is allowed by the privacy parameter ǫ. This is akin to
providing edge privacy as opposed to node privacy in the context of graph data [8, §1]; the latter being
a stronger notion of privacy. Later on we discuss why we chose trip privacy as our preferred notion.
In more detail, we in fact first partition the Opal dataset according to date and transport modes, so
that for each transport mode and date pair, we obtain a separate partition (See Section 4). This then
amounts to providing privacy of a trip of an individual on a particular date and transport mode.
The following definition is useful in interpreting (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [6, §1.6].
Definition 2. Two random variables Y and Y ′ taking on values in R are called (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable
if for every S ⊆ R, the following holds
P(Y ∈ S) ≤ eǫP(Y ′ ∈ S) + δ.
With the above definition, we can interpret (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy as ǫ-differential privacy with
probability at least 1− δ in light of the following theorem [9], [6].
Theorem 1. Two random variables Y and Y ′ are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable if and only if there are
events E (in the sample space of Y ) and E′ (in the sample space of Y ′) such that
• P(E),P(E′) ≥ 1− δ, and
• Y given E and Y ′ given E′ are (ǫ, 0)-indistinguishable.
An important property of differential privacy is that it composes [5].
Theorem 2 (Basic composition). If M1, . . .Mk are each (ǫ, δ)-differentially private then M =
(M1, . . . ,Mk) is (kǫ, kδ)-differentially private.
The above is sometimes referred to as (basic) sequential composition as opposed to parallel com-
position defined next.
Theorem 3 (Parallel composition [10]). Let Mi each provide (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Let Xi be
arbitrary disjoint subsets of the domain X . The sequence of Mi(D ∩ Xi) provides (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, where D ∈ Xn.
Note that partitioning the domain X into disjoint sets means partitioning a dataset D into disjoint
sets of rows and not disjoint sets of columns. Indeed partitioning into disjoint sets of rows means that
addition and removal of a row changes only one of the disjoint sets.
A query is defined as a function q : Xn → R.
Definition 3 (Counting queries and point functions). A counting query is specified by a predicate
q : X → {0, 1} and extended to datasets D ∈ Xn by summing up the predicate on all n rows of the
dataset as
q(D) =
∑
x∈D
q(x).
A point function [6] is the sum of the predicate qy : X → {0, 1}, which evaluates to 1 if the row is equal
to the point y ∈ X and 0 otherwise, over the dataset D. Note that computing all point functions, i.e.,
answering the query qy(D) for all y ∈ X , amounts to computing the histogram of the dataset D.
Definition 4 (Global sensitivity [5, 6]). The global sensitivity of a counting query q : Xn → N is
∆q = max
D,D′∈Xn
D∼D′
‖q(D)− q(D′)‖1,
where ‖·‖1 is the l1-norm.6
6For a vector x, the l1-norm ‖x‖1 is defined as
∑
i
|xi|, where xi is the ith element of x and i ranges over all elements
of x.
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It is easy to see that the global sensitivity of a counting query q : Xn → N is 1.
Definition 5 (Local sensitivity [5, 6]). The local sensitivity of a counting query q : Xn → N at the
dataset D ∈ Xn is
∆q = max
D∼D′
‖q(D)− q(D′)‖1.
The difference between local and global sensitivity is that whereas the latter is defined over all
possible neighbouring datasets D,D′, the former is only evaluated at neighbours of a fixed dataset D,
i.e., the input dataset. A key property of differential privacy is that it is immune to post-processing.
That means that a released dataset from a differentially private algorithm cannot be further processed
to reduce privacy (without access to the original dataset).
Theorem 4 (Post-processing [5]). If M : Xn → R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private and f : R → R′ is
any randomized function, then f ◦M : Xn → R′ is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
The Laplace mechanism is employed as a building block in the main algorithm we use to generate
the (privacy-preserving) Opal Dataset.
Definition 6 (Laplace mechanism [1]). The Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale b has the
probability density function
Lap(x | b) =
1
2b
e−
|x|
b .
We shall remove the argument x, and simply denote the above by Lap(b). Let q : Xn → R be a query.
The mechanism
MLap(q,D, ǫ) = q(D) + Lap
(
∆q
ǫ
)
is known as the Laplace mechanism.7 The Laplace mechanism is ǫ-differentially private [5, §3.3].
Furthermore, with probability at least 1− β [5, §3.3]
max
q∈Q
|q(D)−MLap(q,D, ǫ)| ≤
∆q
ǫ
ln
(
1
β
)
.
= α,
where β ∈ (0, 1]. If q is a counting query, then ∆q = 1, and the error α is
α =
1
ǫ
ln
(
1
β
)
with probability at least 1− β.
From the CDF of the Laplace distribution, we see that for any t ≥ 0,
P (Lap(b) ≥ tb) =
1
2
exp(−t) ≤ exp(−t) (1)
The following definition relates to the output distribution of point functions on a dataset D.
Definition 7. We say that a dataset D is (k, γ)-dense if a γ fraction of points x ∈ D have qx(D) ≥ k.
A dataset is said to be dense, if the values of k and γ are large, and sparse otherwise.
Note that we have deliberately not made the second part of the definition precise. This is because
we shall only use the above definition to informally interpret the output of the algorithm (described
next), for which the relative difference between dense and sparse datasets suffices.
7Recall that ∆q denotes the sensitivity of the query q (global or local).
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3 The Stability-based Histogram Algorithm
In this section we describe the algorithm we used to generate differentially private Opal data. The
algorithm, which appears in [6, §7.1], [11], slightly modifies the online version of the algorithm proposed
in [12], and generates a differentially private synthetic dataset (approximately) answering all point
functions qy, where y ∈ X . That is, the algorithm can be used to approximate the histogram of a
dataset D. We represent the algorithm in Algorithm 1, and then discuss the intuition behind the
algorithm followed by its privacy and utility guarantees. We call this algorithm the stability-based
histogram algorithm, following [6, §3.3]. Shortening further, we shall refer to this algorithm as the
SBH algorithm from now onwards.
Algorithm 1: Stability-based Histogram [6, 11, 12]
Input: Domain X , dataset D ∈ Xn, parameters ǫ and δ.
1 Initialize Dout ← ∅.
2 for each point x ∈ X do
3 if qx(D) = 0 then set ax = 0.
4 if qx(D) > 0 then
5 Set ax ← qx(D) + Lap(
2
ǫ
).
6 if ax < 2 ln
(
2
δ
)
/ǫ+ 1 then
7 Set ax ← 0.
8 else
9 Set ax ← round(ax).
10 if ax > 0 then append ax copies of x to Dout.
11 Output Dout.
3.1 Some Remarks about the SBH Algorithm
The algorithm leverages on the answers to the point functions being stable in the neighbourhood of
the dataset D. That is if the local sensitivity of the query does not change after removing a few rows
from D, we can consider the answers to those queries as being stable. The “few” in the previous
sentence is characterized precisely via the threshold set in step 6 of the SBH algorithm. We shall refer
to the right hand term in the inequality as the threshold. If the dataset is dense8 then the answers
to most point functions on points in the dataset are expected to be above the threshold, and hence
will be present in the output (after perturbation via the Laplace mechanism). However, this might
not hold in general for all datasets. Consider for instance a dataset D each row of which contains a
unique ID. This means that the answer to each point function on the dataset is either 1 (if the ID is
present in the dataset), or 0 (if the ID is not present in the dataset). With overwhelming probability
(depending on δ) the output will be an empty dataset.9 Thus, in order to get some non-trivial output
from the algorithm, the dataset should not be too sparse. Hence, in principle, the algorithm can
be used for any dataset, even those that contain identifying information. It is simply the case that
such identifying information will result in the algorithm not reproducing those rows in the output (by
virtue of being sparse). In order to ensure that the algorithm produces some non-trivial synthetic
dataset, we therefore removed some of the information that would make the original dataset sparse
and aggregated other information to improve density. We will give more details on this in Section 4.
8Recall our definition of dense and sparse datasets (Definition 7).
9From a utility point of view this is still good, since the answer to each point function is either 0 or 1, and an empty
dataset means that every point function had a count less than the threshold.
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3.2 Privacy and Utility of the SBH Algorithm
The privacy of the SBH algorithm is established in the following theorem whose proof we reproduce
from [6, 12] for completeness.
Theorem 5. The SBH algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private [6,12].
Proof. Notice that it suffices to argue privacy for the answers ax to the queries qx, since the output
dataset Dout can be constructed through the queries qx and their answers ax via post-processing.
Consider two neighbouring datasets D and D′, where D′ is obtained from D by replacing row x with
row x′. Then the only point queries whose answers differ in the two datasets are qx and qx′ . Since
each point query qy is independent of any other point query, we can look at the two aforementioned
queries separately. After proving privacy for each, we can use composition to argue privacy for both
together.
Consider the answers ax(D) and ax(D
′) to the query qx on the datasets D and D
′, respectively.
Since the row x is in D, we know that qx(D) > 0. If it is also true that qx(D
′) > 0 then ax(D) and
ax(D
′) are (ǫ/2, 0)-indistinguishable due to the Laplace mechanism, where the subsequent steps 6 and
7 maintain (ǫ/2, 0)-indistinguishability by the closure under post-processing property of differential
privacy. If on the other hand we have qx(D
′) = 0, then ax(D
′) is always 0. But qx(D) = 1, since D
and D′ are neighbouring datasets that differ in only one row, i.e., x, and therefore agree on all other
rows. Now, we want to show that the probability that ax(D) 6= 0 is bounded by δ/2. We call the
event ax(D) 6= 0 as the bad event. This is only possible if
qx(D) + Lap
(
2
ǫ
)
≥
2
ǫ
ln
(
2
δ
)
+ 1
⇒ 1 + Lap
(
2
ǫ
)
≥
2
ǫ
ln
(
2
δ
)
+ 1
⇒ Lap
(
2
ǫ
)
≥
2
ǫ
ln
(
2
δ
)
.
Therefore, by setting b = 2
ǫ
and t = ln
(
2
δ
)
in Eq. 1, we get
P(ax(D) 6= 0) = P
(
Lap
(
2
ǫ
)
≥
2
ǫ
ln
(
2
δ
))
≤ exp
(
− ln
(
2
δ
))
=
δ
2
Thus the answers ax(D) and ax(D
′) are (0, δ/2)-indistinguishable. Together with the previous case,
by composition, answers ax(D) and ax(D
′) are (ǫ/2, δ/2)-indistinguishable. By symmetry, the same
holds for the answers ax′(D) and ax′(D
′). For all other point functions the answers are identically
distributed in the two datasets. Therefore, by composition all answers are (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable.
The rounding step in Step 9 is simple post-processing. Hence, the mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private.
The following theorem states the utility of the SBH algorithm.
Theorem 6. All point queries on the synthetic dataset Dout have error at most O
(
ln 2
δ
ǫ
)
.
Proof. See [6, §3.3, p. 24].
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3.3 Why the SBH Algorithm?
When applied to the Opal dataset, the SBH algorithm had several advantages that we highlight in
the following.
3.3.1 Computational Efficiency
The SBH algorithm has the advantage that the run time is polynomial in n, i.e., the number of rows in
the dataset, as opposed to polynomial in the size of the domain X , which in turn is exponentially large
in the number of attributes. In fact, the domain size |X | can become substantially large with only a
few attributes of high cardinality. For instance, consider a domain X having 4 attributes, each with
cardinality 1000. Then the size of the domain, i.e., |X | is already 1012. To see why the SBH algorithm
has run time polynomial in n, note that we need not run through each point x ∈ X mentioned in
step 2 of the algorithm. Instead, we need only run through points that exist in the dataset (since the
point functions of all the points not in the dataset D have by definition answers of 0).
However, care must be taken with this modification of the algorithm for reasons of privacy. More
specifically, we need to ensure that the rows of the dataset D are either randomly shuffled or sorted
in some prescribed order independent of the data, e.g., lexicographic order. This can be done either
before or after the application of the (modified) algorithm. To see why order is important, consider
two neighbouring datasets D and D′ that only differ in the first row. In dataset D, the first row is
x, and in dataset D′ the first row is x′. The rest of the rows in the two datasets are identical (both
in order and value). Now assume that qx(D) and qx′(D
′) are both non-zero and significantly greater
than the threshold 2
ǫ
ln
(
2
δ
)
of the SBH algorithm. Then, with overwhelming probability the first few
rows in the output dataset from D will be equal to the point x and the first few rows in the output
dataset from D′ will be equal to the point x′. Thus, the two outputs are not (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable
for any reasonable values of ǫ and δ. It is easy to see how this is avoided when the original dataset
D is sorted according to some fixed order independent of the dataset. Or, equivalently, via a random
shuffle.
3.3.2 Introducing New Points
Another feature of the SBH algorithm is that it does not introduce new points in its output. That
is, it only outputs those points that exist in the original dataset D, and any points not in D, but
in the domain, are not present in the output. This is, of course, done with the drawback that some
points of D are stripped from the output. In essence, points with low or zero counts are both mapped
to zero counts. It was one of the desired characteristics of the synthetic Opal dataset that no new
points be added. Without this requirement, a straightforward mechanism to output the histogram
of some dataset D, i.e., answering all point functions, is to apply Laplace noise of magnitude 1/ǫ to
the answer ax(D) of each point x ∈ X (even points that are not present in D). Of course all possible
points in the (unrestricted) domain might include points that have no meaning in the real world. For
instance, a point might correspond to a trip whose route is not in service at that particular time.
In a post-processing step, these anomalies can potentially be ruled out. But doing so in general is
not easy, as each row needs to be checked for consistency. In the absence of rules to automatically
check for consistency, this becomes a prohibitive task. Nevertheless, the algorithm could be used if
a dictionary of all possible trips (tap locations and time combinations) is provided.10 However, such
a modification now relies on the domain size, and depending on the size, this algorithm can become
prohibitive.
10One may also simply leave these “anomalies” in tact as a natural by product of the synthetic data generation
algorithm. But this is not desirable from a usability perspective. An analyst using the dataset does not know whether
a given trip is valid or not without further knowledge of all possible valid trips.
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4 Application to the Opal Dataset
In this section we describe how we applied the SBH algorithm on the Opal dataset and our choice of
privacy parameters.
4.1 Producing the Output
Looking at the SBH algorithm, it is clear that as long as the given dataset is sufficiently dense, the
output will contain many points from the original dataset. In order to make the dataset more dense
we performed a number of pre-processing steps. Note that these steps were taken to increase the
density of the dataset(s) to control the impact on utility only. While steps similar to these are used
in other settings in an attempt to provide privacy, these do not need to be interpreted as improving
privacy in our case, as privacy is automatically guaranteed by the process being differentially private.
As discussed below, we actually partitioned the dataset into disjoint partitions. After that we applied
the SBH algorithm on several combination of columns (attributes) from each partition to release
several differentially private synthetic datasets. The following is the summary of the steps taken.
1. We removed any unique identifiers. These by definition make the dataset sparse.
2. We binned the tap-on and off times to within a 15 minute window.
3. The number of possible tap-on and tap-off locations for buses (i.e., bus stops) lead to sparseness.
We therefore collapsed them into postcodes.
4. We partitioned the dataset into 4 × 14 = 56 disjoint datasets. This was done by first splitting
the dataset by the four transport modes and then separating the datasets belonging to different
days.
5. For each partitioned dataset, we only retained tap-on and tap-off times and locations (the date
and mode of transport is now a constant).
6. Fix a partitioned dataset Di, where i indicates the partition number. We further partitioned the
dataset into 6 different datasets according to the combination of columns. These 6 combinations
were: (1) tap-on times, (2) tap-on locations, (3) tap-off times, (4) tap-off locations, (5) tap-on
times and locations, and (6) tap-off times and locations. We label these datasets Di,j , where
1 ≤ j ≤ 6. Note that these new partitions are not disjoint.
7. We ran the SBH algorithm on each dataset Di,j to obtain the corresponding synthetic dataset,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 56 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 6. The parameters used for the SBH algorithm for the datasetD·,j
were ǫj and δj , subject to the condition that
∑6
j=1 ǫj = ǫ and
∑6
j=1 δj = δ. Note that implicitly
we are saying that the same parameter pair (ǫj , δj) is used for datasets Di,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ 56.
We now show that the whole process is differentially private.
Theorem 7. The released Opal datasets are (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. First note that steps 1, 2, 3 and 5 are essentially fixing the domain X and therefore apply
equally to all datasets D from Xn. Therefore, these steps have no bearing on differential privacy. For
the remaining steps, first fix an i. Then we see that all outputs from the datasets Di,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 6, are
altogether (
∑6
j=1 ǫj ,
∑6
j=1 δj) = (ǫ, δ)-differentially private due to the sequential composition theorem
(see Theorem 2). Now, all outputs Di,j , for 1 ≤ i ≤ 56 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 are (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
according to the parallel composition theorem (See Theorem 3), since each set Di,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 6, is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private. This completes the proof.
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Remark 2. Recall our discussion on trip privacy in Remark 1. We note that since any identifying
information has already been removed in the output datasets, and since the datasets have been decoupled
into different datasets based on transport modes and dates, there is no obvious link between the trips.
Therefore, we believe that the somewhat weaker notion of trip privacy, as opposed to all trips from an
individual, is reasonable in this case.
4.2 Choice of Parameters
Our discussion in this section applies to a generic disjoint partition i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 56. We therefore
omit the subscript i and will simply refer to the 6 further partitions of the dataset Di, as D1, . . . , D6.
Recall that according to our labelling, datasetsD1, . . . , D4 correspond to the one-way marginal counts,
and datasets D5 and D6 correspond to the two-way marginal counts. We set the values of ǫj’s as
follows
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = ǫ4 = 1,
ǫ5 = ǫ6 = 2.
The decision of assigning ǫj’s is one of balancing privacy against utility. The higher privacy budget
assigned to the two-way marginals ensured that more points were present in the output datasets. This
means that the overall value of ǫ was 8 (by basic composition). This value of ǫ is admittedly higher
than what is generally considered in the differential privacy literature.11 However, due to the removal
of sensitive or identifying information, we believe that this is a reasonably trade-off between privacy
and utility.
For δ, recall that in theory δ is supposed to be smaller than any inverse polynomial power of n,
where n is the size of the dataset D. However, in practice, we need to instantiate δ with some value.
Once we instantiate δ, by definition δ is a constant, and is no longer equivalent to its theoretical
definition. Therefore, in practice we need to ensure that δ is a small constant (relative to the size of
the dataset). By looking at the SBH algorithm, we see that we need to set δ such that the probability
of the bad event12 is small. This probability is given by δj/2. We fixed δj = 1/8000000 ≈ 2−23,
making this probability approximately 2−24. The value of δj ≈ 2
−23 implies that the overall value
of δ (by basic composition) is less than 2−20 or 10−6. This value of δ has been used before in the
literature [13, §6], and is slightly far from another value of 2−30 recommended in [14, §8, p. 11].
5 Conclusion
Privacy-preserving high dimensional data release is a difficult problem. Research in differential privacy
has resulted in many proposed algorithms that seek to generate synthetic versions of the data such
that they give approximately correct answers to a specific set of queries. However, in many cases
such algorithms take time proportional to the data universe, i.e., the size of the data domain, which
in turn is exponential in the number of attributes present in the dataset. Thus, in practice many of
these algorithms are not viable for data release.13 Furthermore, in the case of open data the usability
factor is paramount. A synthetic dataset may contain rows that have no meaning in the real world
(e.g., a trip via a route that does not exist.). The purpose of open data is to release the data for any
one to use, experts and novices alike. For such users, presence of such anomalous rows (which are
in fact artefacts of synthetic data) is not desirable. The algorithm to release the Opal dataset was
chosen with these two main considerations in mind. It is possible that in the future better algorithms
can be identified or developed that allow richer insights into transport data. We believe this release
will guide efforts in that direction.
11Although, not by far! For instance, the experimental evaluation of the DualQuery algorithm from Gaboardi et al.
uses an ǫ up to 5 [13, §6].
12See the second paragraph in the proof of Theorem 5 for the definition of the bad event.
13See [6] for a detailed comparison of differentially private algorithms from a computational point of view.
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